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The Significance and Origins 
of the DDF Memorandum
The once-secret CIA document published for the first time below 
has multiple significance for scholars of American-Indonesian relations 
in the cold war period.* 1 First and foremost, this long memorandum 
offers a rare opportunity to gauge the substance and quality of policy 
analysis in the CIA*s Deputy Directorate for Plans (henceforth DDP), 
whose Far East Division under Desmond Fitzgerald2 prepared it at the 
order of DDP Director Richard Bissell in mid-March 1961.3 * Normally 
DDP does not produce papers which can be characterized as a mixture of 
intelligence estimate and policy implications, as Bissell describes the 
contents of the report in his cover memo. The D D P ’s formal responsi­
bility within the CIA is exclusively for Clandestine services11 of 
three main types: intelligence collection, counterintelligence and
covert actions, involving a whole range of operations (or Mdirty
*This article is a modified version of a segment of a larger study about the 
politics of policy formulation on Indonesia in the Kennedy and early Johnson adminis­
trations. I am indebted to the American Philosophical Society and the Vassar College 
Faculty Research Committee for grants which facilitated this research.
1See my note on the source of this document on p. 156.
2In the shakeup of DDP personnel following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Fitzgerald 
was made Deputy Chief of the DDP*s Western Hemisphere Division. See Philip Agee, 
Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Stonehill, 1975), p. 320. Subsequently, in 
early 1963, Fitzgerald was made Chief of the Special Affairs Staff responsible for 
covert Cuban operations. In this role, Fitzgerald figured prominently in the AM/LASH 
assassination plot against Castro. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Interim Report 
No. 94-465, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1975 (henceforth Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots'), especially 
pp. 85-90, 170-76. Subsequently Fitzgerald rose to the number three post in the CIA, 
Deputy Director for Plans. For two revealing anecdotes on Fitzgeraldfs role in U.S. 
Vietnam policy, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random 
House, 1972), pp. 348-49, 408.
3It is Bissell1s personal recollection that Fitzgerald probably authored the 
DDP Indonesia paper. Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973. In January
1961 Fitzgerald had the opportunity to study the Indonesian situation at first hand. 
During a visit to Jakarta he conferred not only with his Chief of Station, Vernet 
Gresham, but his policy antagonist Ambassador Jones. "Ambassador Jones* 1961 
Appointment Book,11 Box 3, Jones Papers. (These recently opened papers of the late 
Ambassador are deposited in the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.)
131
132
tricks") from placing articles in foreign newspapers to assassinating 
foreign political leaders.^ It is thus not the responsibility of the 
DDP to prepare intelligence estimates, a job which is assigned to the 
other side of the CIA structure, the Deputy Directorate for Intelli­
gence (henceforth DDI). Working in part from the raw data reported by 
the DDP, but mainly (ca. 80 percent) from open sources, it is the DDI 
that prepares the several types of finished intelligence products that 
are designed to serve the policy maker. Not only is intelligence anal­
ysis outside the DD P ’s jurisdiction, but the making of policy recommen­
dations is formally excluded from the functions of both DDI and DDP. 
This DDP memorandum is therefore significant not merely because it is 
a once-secret CIA document, but because it is a policy memorandum 
authored by the DDP.
The significance of this DDP paper derives also from the critical 
period in American-Indonesian relations during which it was produced. 
For the early months of 1961 saw major changes developing in both the 
international setting and the domestic politics of both countries.
In the larger international system, the advent of the Kennedy 
administration marked both a global intensification of the cold war 
and a new emphasis on the Third World as a cold war battleground.5 
This intensification was immediately apparent in the rapid escalation 
of Soviet-American competition for influence over the highly strategic 
and resource-rich nonaligned state of Indonesia.
Meanwhile, in Jakarta President Sukarno was preoccupied with con­
solidating the political and institutional arrangements of the highly 
personalized authoritarian political system of Guided Democracy, which 
he had proclaimed with army support in July 1959.6 Concurrently, in 
the sphere of foreign policy Sukarno had elevated his campaign for the 
liberation of West Irian--the last remnant of the former Dutch East 
Indies--to top priority.7 Breaking diplomatic relations with the Dutch
**For brief, but highly reliable discussions of the inner structure of the CIA 
in the early 1960s, see Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots, pp. 1-12. 
Also see U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, hearings on Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1975. Also see Agee, Inside the Company, especially pp. 39-45 and the appen­
dix, which has three charts showing the evolution of the basic organization of the 
CIA. For the most authenticated overview of the CIA!s organizational history, see 
U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re­
spect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report No. 94-755, "History of the Central 
Intelligence Agency," in Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1976, pp. 1-108 (henceforth Church Committee, History of the CIA).
5For a scholarly, moderately revisionist history of the cold war paying close 
attention to both Soviet and American policy, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and 
the Cold War, 1945-1972, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1972).
6Although there is as yet no comprehensive scholarly political history of the 
Guided Democracy period (1959-65), informed overviews appear in J. D. Legge, Sukarno: 
A Political Biography (New York: Praeger, 1972), and Bernhard Dahm, History of Indo­
nesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971). The most penetrating anal­
ysis of the politics of the early Guided Democracy years is still Herbert Feith’s 
"Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF 
Press, 1963), pp. 309-409.
7For a perceptive, but critical perspective on Sukarno’s foreign policy from a
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in August 1960 and collecting his first major military loan from the 
USSR in January 1961, the Indonesian president was bent on securing 
American diplomatic support as well for the rapid achievement of this 
objective.
In Washington, meanwhile, the election of John F. Kennedy had set 
in motion the shuffling of policy makers and the reviewing of priori­
ties and policies that normally marks the transfer of power from one 
president and his party to another.8 High on the Kennedy agenda was 
bringing new urgency and empathy to U.S. relations with the Third 
World, of which Indonesia was perceived as a major, if largely unknown, 
leader.9 Given Sukarno’s bold confrontation strategy for liberating 
West Irian, it was clear that by at least the end of the year the 
young administration would face a complex and crucial test of these 
still uncrystallized policies.
leading Indonesian intellectual, see Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia and the World," Austra­
lian OutlookXXI, 3 (December 1967), pp. 287-306. A more factual and sympathetic 
overview appears in my "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy, 1960-1965: President Sukarno 
Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation," Indonesia3 2 (October 1966), pp. 37-76. 
Compare the articles written between 1961 and 1965 by the prolific Rand Corporation 
analyst Guy Pauker. Especially notable is his "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," 
Foreign Affairs (July 1962), pp. 610-26.
For the most thoroughly documented and systematic exploration of the 1962-70 
Indonesian elite’s outlook, see Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Indonesian Elite’s View 
of the World and the Foreign Policy of Development," Indonesia> 12 (October 1971), 
pp. 97-132. This article, together with the explication of a theory of the functions 
of Indonesian foreign policy appear in Weinstein’s Indonesian Foreign Policy and the 
Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1976). Finally, for one of the few overviews of the history of Indonesian foreign 
policy since independence, again see Franklin B. Weinstein, "Indonesia," in Wayne 
Wilcox et al., Asia and the International System (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1972), 
pp. 116-45.
8The top-level Kennedy foreign policy appointments are portrayed most fully in 
sociological and psychological, as well as political terms, in David Halberstam’s 
often scathing The Best and the Brightest. Also see the more sympathetic sketches 
in the Kennedyphile memoirs cited below.
9The literature on Kennedy’s foreign policy includes major studies from diverse 
ideological perspectives. Still fundamental, especially for Kennedy’s policies in 
the Third World, are the major initial Kennedyphile memoirs. Those most useful for 
this study were: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mif­
flin, 1965); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the 
Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); and William Attwood, 
The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Two later memoirs are also 
useful because of their differing vantage points and interpretations. See W. W. 
Rostow’s laudatory The Diffusion of Power, 1957-1972 (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 
and the disillusioned liberal Chester Bowles’s critical Promises to Keep (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971).
Secondary "revisionist" studies include those of the radical liberals Richard 
Walton, Cold War and Counter-revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New 
York: Viking Press, 1972), and Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (Cleve­
land: World, 1968); of the orthodox Marxist Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American 
Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); and of the right-wing Malcolm E. Smith, 
Jr., Kennedy rs 13 Great Mistakes in the White Rouse (New York: National Forum of 
America, 1968).
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Thanks to a mid-February decision by President Sukarno to take up 
President Kennedy’s open-dated invitation to visit. Washington in late 
April, the American government had to meet that test much sooner than 
expected.10 The scheduling of Sukarno’s visit thus had the effect of 
galvanizing the DDP and all other aspirant architects of Kennedy’s 
Indonesia policy into intensifying their competition for influence.
It was the occurrence of this clearly defined ten-week period of prepa­
ration for Sukarno’s visit that not only explains the timing of the 
D D P ’s paper, but also adds another dimension to its significance for 
the scholar. For the relative suddenness and the high stakes involved 
in the Sukarno visit meant that the production of comparable documents 
from divergent agencies and individuals was unusually heavy. A three- 
year effort by the author and the highly competent archivists of the 
Kennedy Library has led to the declassification of most of these rich 
documentary sources.11 The extraordinary DDP policy memorandum thus 
takes on added significance precisely because it can be viewed not in 
isolation, but alongside various contemporary memoranda with which it 
was contending for presidential attention and approval.
Although the politics of policy formulation in anticipation of 
Sukarno’s visit involved organizations, groups, and individuals that 
were outside as well as inside the U.S. government, the focus here will 
be on the politics of organizations and individuals (now popularly known 
as ’’bureaucratic politics” ) within the executive branch.12 Involving 102
10For the memoirs of two participants in the preparations for the Sukarno- 
Kennedy meeting, see Howard P. Jones, Indonesia, the Possible Dream (New York: Har- 
court, Brace, Jovanovish, 1971), especially pp. 188-201; and Rostow, Diffusion of 
Power, pp. 192-96. Although not directly involved, both Schlesinger, A Thousand 
Days3 pp. 532-36, and Hilsman, To Move a Nation^ pp. 361-81, have clearly drawn on 
both documents and personal interviews to reconstruct the meeting and the 1961 con­
text.
The most recent secondary accounts to treat this episode are William Henderson, 
West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement (New York: Seton Hall University 
Press for the American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1973), pp. 114-43, and my MThe 
Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 
1969), especially pp. 65-77.
11My forthcoming book on the politics of Indonesia policy formulation under 
Kennedy and Johnson attempts to integrate these documentary sources with extensive 
interview data and various secondary sources. Hopefully other scholars, both Indone­
sian and American, will also begin exploiting these documents.
12The ambiguous and misleading term ”bureaucratic politics” is used here, more 
as a symbol than a rigorous category, to connote a broad approach geared to the highly 
political process by which foreign policy is formulated. This eclectic approach re­
sembles most closely the one employed in Hilsman’s To Move a Nation, especially chap­
ters 1-8, 35, 36; and Abraham Lowenthal, ’’’Liberal,’ ’Radical,’ and ’Bureaucratic’ 
Perspectives on U.S. Latin American Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Retrospect,” 
in Julio Cotier and Richard Fagan (eds.), Latin America and the United States (Stan­
ford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 212-35. Also see Charles Stevenson, The 
End of Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos since 1954 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
There is thus no attempt here to apply rigorously either of the three models of 
the foreign-policy formulation process that Graham Allison developed in his The 
Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). A less rigorous but more fully 
illustrated presentation appears in Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and For­
eign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974). Finally, see the highly 
lucid and instructive, if admittedly still primitive, effort of a distinguished
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the middle-level bureaucratic echelons from the start, this politics 
engaged the higher-level policymaking circles (i.e., people with the 
rank of Assistant Secretary and above) as early as mid-February 1961. 
While winning only brief attention from a president preoccupied with 
the escalating crises in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo,13 Indone­
sia did command substantial interest in the weekly meetings of a more 
informal interagency policy-planning forum just below the National 
Security Council (NSC) in status. This was known as the Tuesday lunch 
group14 and its membership embraced the senior officials of the four 
most powerful agencies in the foreign policy-cum-national security com­
plex: McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs; Walt Rostow, the President’s Deputy Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs; George McGhee, Counselor of the State 
Department and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council; Paul Nitze, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA); 
Robert Amory, Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence (DDI); and 
Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of the CIA for Plans (DDP).
The fact that the DDP paper was prepared at Bissell*s initiative 
for this highly influential Tuesday lunch group underlines its real 
political importance. For, unlike many other memoranda of the Sukarno 
visit period, the DDP paper not only reached the desks of top policy­
makers, but probably was actually discussed by them.15
diplomatic historian to integrate all three of the Allison models into "a synthetic 
model of governmental action": Ernest May, "The ’Bureaucratic Politics1 Approach:
U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1942-1947," in Cotier and Fagan (eds.), Latin America and 
the United States, pp. 129-63.
In employing even an eclectic bureaucratic politics approach here, I am acutely 
aware of its inherent limitations. Apart from the familiar dangers of seduction by 
"models" and their baggage of often murky jargon, the most serious risk is the im­
plicit embrace of more fundamental empirical and value assumptions about the locus 
and nature of power in both the American political system and in America’s relations 
with the Third World. For a provocative, if fragmented, discussion of whether the 
bureaucratic politics approach constitutes a complement to or a substitute for "the 
radical perspective" (especially the models of the dependency school) and "the lib­
eral perspective," see the conflicting views outlined in "Some North American Per­
spectives," in ibid., pp. 129-37. For other related dangers see I. M. Destler, 
Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1972), pp. 65-72.
1interviews with officials concerned with Indonesia in all the major foreign 
policy agencies confirm the constant difficulties involved in competing with major 
crisis areas for the limited attention of the president and his staff. For a brief 
discussion of this "attention" problem, see Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 129-30.
14As the membership suggests, this group was seen as a vehicle for long-range 
planning, as well as a forum for debating current sub-crisis-level problems. See 
Rostow, Diffusion of Power, p. 169.
15Given the high prestige still enjoyed by the CIA--and especially the DDP--in 
this pre-Bay of Bigs period, the likelihood of Bissell’s colleagues reading and re­
acting to the DDP paper seems high. See Church Committee, History of the CIA. 
Regrettably, however, the Kennedy archives yield only one memorandum reacting direct­
ly to the paper. Written by White House adviser Robert Komer, this particular docu­
ment has been denied declassification by the NSC. In that Komer came to his White 
House role after nearly a decade as an intelligence analyst in the DDI, his reaction 
to the DDP paper would be especially valuable for weighing intramural CIA factional
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Purposes of This Commentary
In offering a brief and tentative commentary on this extraordinary 
DDP document, the first task is to sketch more fully the larger b u r e a u ­
cratic politics11 * setting of which the Tuesday lunch group was only a 
small, albeit powerful, component. After introducing the DDP's allies 
and adversaries the commentary turns directly to explication of the 
actual meaning of the paper. Here a brief survey of the DDP’s assess­
ment of Indonesian politics (what Bissell’s cover memorandum calls the 
intelligence estimate" component of the paper) precedes a more lengthy 
analysis of D D P ’s policy recommendations. Attention is given both to 
the DD P !s appraisal of three broad alternative policy postures and its 
stand on the immediate policy issues that ranked at the top of the 
Indonesian-American agenda in early 1961, namely, the escalating Dutch- 
Indonesian dispute over ownership of West New Guinea (or West Irian) 
and the interrelated question of American military and economic assis­
tance to the Sukarno government. In explaining the D D P ’s views, the 
commentary seeks to illuminate how and why the D D P fs assumptions relate 
to those of other major executive agency participants in the policy 
debate of the spring of 1961. A brief conclusion addresses the complex 
empirical question of how much influence the D D P ’s perspectives appear 
to have had on the ultimate target of all the aspirant architects of 
Indonesia policy--President Kennedy.
The Bureaucratic Politics Setting
Before proceeding with the interpretative summary it is necessary 
to introduce briefly the dramatis -personae of this "bureaucratic poli­
tics" struggle for influence. Since the collapse of the abortive U.S.- 
supported rebellion against Sukarno in the spring of 1958, the major 
bureaucratic groups and leading personalities had tended to arrange 
themselves into two informal coalitions or factions. Variously charac­
terized by former participants and commentators, they are labeled here 
as the "accommodationists" and the "hard-liners."16 In early 1961, 
with the advent of a new administration, both the internal composition 
of the factions and the balance of power between them was in flux.
politics, as well as the broader interagency struggle for influence. See (in 10 more
years!) "R. W. Komer memo to McG. Bundy commenting on CIA ((Bissell)) Indonesia 
paper," March 27, 1961, National Security File: Countries Series--Indonesia, Kennedy
Library. (Henceforth, file location is abbreviated in archival style, NSF:C0--Indo-
nesia. Unless otherwise noted, all documents cited are housed at the Kennedy Li­
brary. )
16The following brief and tentative sketch of the nature and distribution of 
influence on Indonesia policy within the Kennedy administration in early 1961 derives 
in part from a more extensive analysis of the influence patterns in 1962-63 contained 
in my "Kennedy Initiatives," pp. 84-95. The portrayal here also builds, however, on 
my conversations over the last six years with most of the former officials identified 
below. To protect their anonymity--at least with regard to particular judgments 
about particular personalities--! have limited footnoting in this section primarily 
to relevant published sources and documents. Reinforcing this decision is my recog­
nition that a more credible reconstruction demands both more data and greater famil­
iarity with decision-making theory than I currently command.
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This process of factional realignment added to the complexity of and 
the stakes involved in the politics of Indonesia policy formulation. 
Especially given the circumstance that few of the new top policy offi­
cials- - including the president--had had any substantial contact with 
Indonesian problems, there was considerable opportunity for the sur­
viving factional leaders to convert their new policymaking superiors 
to their respective views.17
The Hard-liners: The DDP and the EUR
In early 1961 a small group within the D D P fs Far Eastern Division 
functioned as the junior partner in a hard-liner coalition dominated 
by the State Department’s Bureau of Western European Affairs (EUR).18 
While the EUR’s opposition to accommodation with Sukarno stemmed from 
an instinctive Europeanist, pro-Dutch outlook, the DDP's Far Eastern 
Division was basically Asianist and intensely Sukarnophobe in orienta­
tion. Despite these differing perspectives the two hard-liner groups 
worked effectively till late fall 1961 to slow the offensive mounted 
by the expanded forces of the accommodationists--especially on the West 
Irian question.19 This partial success depended heavily on their abil­
ity to secure some influential backing at the top levels of their re ­
spective parent organizations. Though motivated by a limits-of-power 
phil osophy rather than the Sukarnophobia of his Far Eastern Division,
DDP Director Bissell not only endorsed their paper but actively pro­
moted its viewpoint in the strategic Tuesday lunch forum.20 Concur­
rently, within the State Department, at least with regard to the 
crucial matter of West Irian, the EUR could count on the strong support 
of both U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Secretary Rusk himself.21 
These notable gains from among Kennedy’s new appointments were, how­
ever, offset by other bureaucratic shifts that in December 1961 ulti­
mately gave the accommodationists full ascendancy over Indonesia policy. 
Among the personnel changes damaging to the hard-liner camp was the
17I am indebted to former Ambassador James Bell for his emphasis on the signi­
ficance of this knowledge factor in accounting for Ambassador Jones' relative success 
in commanding an audience in Washington. Interview with Bell, July 1976. Compare 
Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 129-32.
18See Jones, Indonesia, pp. 180-81, 191, and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 377.
19EUR dominance in late 1961 was reflected in the U.S. posture in the U.N. Gen­
eral Assembly debate on West Irian in October-November 1961. See Schlesinger, A 
Thousand Days, p. 534; Jones, Indonesia, pp. 200-201; and Henderson, West New Guinea, 
pp. 122-27. The efforts of not only Ambassador Jones but also of White House advisers 
to moderate the de facto ’’Europeanist” policy adopted by the American U.N. delegation 
are repeatedly manifested in the contemporary government memoranda. See NSF:CO--West 
New Guinea.
20Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973.
21As noted below, Rusk's support was influenced probably more by his attachment 
to the moral principle of self-determination than by a Europeanist outlook. Inter­
view with Robert Johnson, August 1970. In fact, given his early professional in­
volvement with East Asia, Rusk brought to Southeast Asian problems--Indonesia, as 
well as Vietnam--a sense of urgency about checking Chinese communist expansionism 
that precluded the detachment that his "Europeanist" Under Secretary, George Ball, 
brought to the Vietnam issue. See Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp.
306-46.
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loss of the most ardent spokesman for the Asianist-Sukarnophobe view­
point inside the State Department. This was Hugh Cumming, State’s 
Director of Intelligence and Research from 1956 to his retirement at 
the end of the Eisenhower administration in late I960.22 Cumming1s 
importance lay above all in the fact that he had effectively used his 
close connections with the Dulles brothers to cement a personal and 
institutional link between hard-liners in his INR and both the CI A ’s 
analysts in the DDI and its operators in the DDP. It is this linkage 
role that makes credible, for example, reports that Cumming had a major 
role in securing top-level sanction for the D D P ’s abortive operation 
in support of the Indonesian regional rebellions in 1957-58. The 
failure of that operation had already eroded the influence of the Su- 
karnophobes in the INR and the DDP, but Cumming’s replacement by Roger 
Hilsman was a clear symbol of the growing threat to the hard-liners 
posed by many Kennedy appointments. Although his influence as Director 
of the INR was more limited than Cumming’s had been, Hilsman’s subse­
quent appointment in early 1963 as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 
Affairs saw him emerge as a major architect of the administration’s 
grand accommodationist strategy for channeling Sukarno’s nationalism 
into ’’constructive” channels.23
The Accommodationists: Ambassador 
Jones and the President’s New Men
As study of the DDP document reveals, the DDP correctly perceived 
the recently reappointed American Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard 
Jones, as the most articulate, persistent, and influential spokesman 
of the accommodationist faction. What is not directly evident from 
the DDP paper is that Jones’s views commanded rising support in several 
strategic locations within the administration. His firmest base of 
strength was in the middle levels of the State Department’s Bureau of 
Far Eastern Affairs (FE) . Two key desk officers, Lindquist for Indone­
sia and Ingraham for Australia, shared with their boss, James Bell,
22This account of Cummingfs role in the formulation of U.S. policy is based on 
the testimony of several informants who prefer anonymity. For a brief reference to 
Cumming’s posture on Indonesia in 1957 in the context of the broader story of the 
genesis of the CIAfs covert action program against Sukarno in the fall of that year, 
see the memoirs of Cumming’s successor as Ambassador to Indonesia: John Allison, 
Ambassador from the Prairie (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 293-344, especially 
p. 308.
23For a highly perceptive, if sometimes self-serving, analysis of Hilsman*s 
role in policymaking, see his To Move a Nation3 especially pp. 361-412. One step 
‘Hilsman took in early 1961 was to invite scholars of a more moderate orientation to 
challenge the often militantly anticommunist memoranda produced for government con­
sumption by Rand Corporation Indonesia analyst, Guy Pauker. Interview with Professor 
George McT. Kahin, August 1976.
The Kennedy archives for early 1961 testify dramatically to the easy and exten­
sive access that Pauker enjoyed throughout the executive branch at that time. Not 
only are many of his memoranda and published articles prominent in the file, but he 
appears to be on a first-name basis with both White House advisers, including Walt 
Rostow, and DDP officials. The extent to which this extraordinary access translated 
into influence over policy is a question which I address in my forthcoming book as 
part of the broader issue of the role of scholars in the politics of Indonesia policy 
formulation.
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Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, both personal 
affection for Jones and strong support for his advocacy of an accommo- 
dationist strategy toward Sukarno.2£f They would, for example, have 
readily joined the Ambassador in applauding the New Y e a r ’s Resolution 
drafted by his Deputy Chief of Mission on the West Irian issue: . .
W e ’ve got to settle the West Irian dispute, and the only way it will 
ever be settled will be if Indonesia gets it.”* 25
This small group of what might be called ’’true Jonesians” domi­
nated both the Embassy and the F E ’s Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs. 
As of early 1961, however, they had not yet found a sympathetic and 
powerful ally at the crucial policymaking level.26 Although the Acting 
Assistant Secretary John Steeves shared Jones’s sense of urgency about 
settling the West Irian dispute, both he and the newly designated 
Assistant Secretary Walter McConaughy lacked the personality and polit­
ical weight to represent the FE effectively in intra- or interdepart­
mental discussions. Not until Averell Harriman’s appointment as Assis­
tant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in November 1961 would the 
Jonesians in State benefit from a receptive and influential boss. Only 
then was the FE able to contain the hitherto paramount influence of EUR 
over U.S. policy on West Irian.
Outside the State Department, the accommodationists’ coalition 
included quiet backing from army elements in the Department of Defense.27 
Together with D O D ’s civilian political advisers in the Office of Inter­
national Security Affairs (ISA), these elements prized the intimate re­
lationship with the Indonesian army generated by the still modest pro­
gram for training Indonesian officers in the U.S. Plans were already
2AfReinforcing these attitudes was the fact that all three men had served at 
least briefly in the Jakarta Embassy under Jones between March 1958 and December 
1960. Interviews with Lindquist in December 1973; Ingraham in June 1970 and July 
1971; Bell in July 1976.
25Jones, Indonesia, p. 191.
26For Steeves’ views on West Irian, see Allison, Ambassador from the Brairie> 
pp. 331-32. As for the importance of Harriman’s appointment as Assistant Secretary 
for the Far East, this is stressed in most of the relevant memoirs. See also my 
"Kennedy Initiatives," pp. 77-84, and Henderson, West New Guinea> pp. 142-43. The 
legacy of McCarthyism is subtly and colorfully depicted in James Thomson’s account 
of the FE as "dominated by Cold Warriors and staffed largely by the cowed." On 
China policy especially, the FE proved resistant to policy change as it "clung tena­
ciously to the doctrine of containment and isolation." See James C. Thomson, Jr.,
"On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics,"
China Quarterly3 50 (April-June 1972), pp. 220-43. For further embroidering on 
Thomson’s themes in relation to Vietnam policy, see Halberstam, The Best and the 
Brightest.
27Hilsman briefly explains this army view of Indonesia in To Move a Nation, 
pp. 376-77. Corroborating evidence comes from the testimony of James Rafferty, Indo­
nesia desk officer for DOD-ISA from the fall of 1961 to the fall of 1965, and Colonel 
George Benson, U.S. Military Attache in Indonesia from 1958 to 1960 and later Special 
Assistant to the Ambassador for Civic Action, 1963-65. (Interviews in December 1973 
and February 1969 respectively.) I am currently preparing an article on U.S. Mili­
tary Assistance Programs in Indonesia, 1961-65.
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under way for expanding that program and also for initiating a civic 
action program to assist the Indonesian army’s operations in rural 
areas.28
The accommodationists also included some analysts in the DDI.
While reflecting some of the DDP's pessimism in its current intelli­
gence estimates, the DDI's stance on West Irian also diverged from the 
DDP view on several grounds--as evidenced mainly in a memorandum 
authored by DDI director Amory.29
Ultimately the most significant center of emerging backing for 
accommodation was the White House. There the president’s two top n a ­
tional security advisers, Bundy and Rostow, had agreed that Rostow 
would have responsibility for Indonesia, as part of his more extensive 
assignment to most of the Third World outside Latin America.30 A some­
what more pragmatic and sober accommodationist than the often ebul­
liently optimistic Jones, Rostow was disposed to endorse qualified 
versions of the Jones initiatives on West Irian and aid.31 Rostow's 
views had in part been influenced by the increasingly strong advocacy 
of accommodation by his two chief assistants, Robert Komer and Robert 
Johnson.32 Their internal staff memoranda to Rostow in March and April
28The first documentary evidence that the Kennedy administration's enthusiasm 
for counterinsurgency would affect U.S. relations with the Indonesian army is a re­
markable memorandum authored by the legendary General Edward Lansdale in April 1961. 
Then assigned to Defense Secretary McNamara’s office as a special assistant, Lansdale 
proposed that the Sukarno visit be used as an occasion to sell not only the army, but 
Sukarno, on the advantages of an American-sponsored civic action program. See Memo­
randum from E. Lansdale to R. L. Gilpatric: ”U.S. Visit of Sukarno, Defense Action,*1 
April 12, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia.
29Amory’s memo is cited below in the course of the analysis of the DDP’s stand 
on West Irian.
30Rostow reports the division of labor with Bundy as follows: "There was plenty 
for both Bundy and me to do. We first split up the crises. He took Cuba, the Congo 
and Berlin, although I joined in the latter from time to time. I took Laos, Vietnam, 
Indonesia— and the developing world, generally, except Latin America, where Goodwin 
and Schlesinger operated. I also was assigned the organization of policy planning 
from the White House end." Diffusion of Power3 p. 168.
31 In his memoirs, Rostow not only endorses the pragmatic reasoning behind U.S. 
pressure on the Dutch to relinquish West Irian to the Indonesians, but he voices sup­
port for the general accommodationist line of 1961: "I do not regret the American 
effort to channel Sukarno onto another path. And in Kennedy's time, from the earliest 
days in his administration I did all I could to encourage that policy. . . . "  See 
Rostow, Diffusion of Powers pp. 192-96. The documents from early 1961 corroborate 
the thrust of his claim, but also show Rostow reluctant, in his final briefing memo­
randum to Kennedy on the eve of Sukarno's visit, to recommend unequivocally that West 
Irian must go to Indonesia as soon as possible. See Rostow’s memorandum to Kennedy, 
"Main Points for Sukarno Visit (Supplement to the authoritative State Department sum­
mary)," April 22, 1961, NSF:C0--Indonesia.
32Robert Komer had recently been transferred to the National Security Council 
Staff after nearly a decade as intelligence analyst for the CIA's DDI. By contrast, 
Robert Johnson had served as a'member of the NSC staff since 1951 and had graduated 
to the third-ranking staff post by 1961. See Johnson's revealing testimony to the 
Church Committee about his motives for volunteering to report what he recollected
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reflect a deepening commitment to the accommodationist strategy.33 34 The 
assertive Komer in particular began to urge that the White House chal­
lenge the Europeanist-dominated State Department’s tendency, supported 
by Secretary Rusk, to determine Indonesia policy.3t* It was this shift 
in the substance and bureaucratic assertiveness of the president’s men 
in the White House that would eventually insure the overall ascendancy 
of the accommodationists in Kennedy’s Indonesia policy. Just as in the 
case of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at State, the culmination of 
these changes would await the shuffling of State and White House offi­
cials in December 1961.
The evolution of the White House staff’s orientation and influence 
was, of course, critical not only to the outcome of the "bureaucratic 
politics" struggle, but also to the crystallization of the dispositions 
of President Kennedy himself.35 These dispositions were ultimately the 
most decisive factor in raising the accommodationists to the threshold 
of dominance over Indonesia policy by the time of Sukarno’s arrival in 
Washington late in April.
An Interpretative Summary— DPP Assessment
Fundamental to the D D P ’s adamant hard-line policy posture is its 
grim general assessment of "Indonesia’s growing vulnerability to commu­
nism" (par. I).36 Registered in the opening sentence of the paper, 
this assessment rests on two basic assumptions about the dynamics of 
Indonesian politics. On the one hand, Sukarno is the "key factor" in 
promoting the communization of both Indonesia’s domestic politics and 
its foreign relations. On the other hand, there is no discernible 
"countervailing force" with sufficient political strength to challenge 
Sukarno. Complaining that the anticommunist dissident movements which
about President Eisenhower’s role in ordering the 1960 CIA assassination plot against 
Lumumba, the leftist Congolese leader. Church Committee, Report on Assassination 
Plots, pp. 55-60.
33A1though Komer emerges as more blunt than Johnson, both seem disposed by 
early April to urge a bold and early U.S. initiative to secure West Irian for Indo­
nesia. See below p. 148 and footnote 51.
34In a trenchant letter to Rostow in early April Komer concludes a biting cri­
tique of State’s U.N. trusteeship proposal with a strong complaint about State’s 
apparent ability to circumvent the NSC staff advisers in reaching the president.
"Incidentally, I still have yet to see State coming up with any 
policy alternatives in their papers, so President would at least know 
range of choices open to him. WNG would have been ideally suited to 
this approach.
"Was it prearranged that after earlier PG discussion and request 
for revision of S/P paper new version should go straight to JFK over 
Rusk’s signature? It seems to me this gives us only ex post facto 
reprise on whether such papers fill the bill."
See Robert Komer letter to Walt Rostow, April 5, 1961, NSF:CO--West New Guinea.
35See below, pp. 153ff., .for a discussion of Kennedyfs views.
36References to particular passages in the DDP document printed below will be 
made by noting in parentheses in the text the appropriate paragraph number of the 
document. Paragraphs cit^d from Attachments A and B will be designated by number 
and preceded by either A or B.
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led the disastrous 1958 regional rebellions "have been permitted to 
wither from lack of sustenance," the DDP concludes that they "no longer 
represent a viable force in being" (par. 1). As for the Indonesian 
army, to which the U.S. had shifted its political hopes after 1958,37 
the DDP judges it as "progressively more ineffectual in its containment 
of communism" (par. 1). (Enunciated in the opening summary paragraph, 
these assessments of communist and free world "assets" in Indonesian 
politics find often emotional, even paranoid, elaboration in the two 
attachments to the central paper, entitled appropriately "A. President 
Sukarno--Key to the Indonesian Situation"38 and "B. Countervailing 
Forces.")
Closely linked to these estimates of Indonesian political forces 
is a highly pessimistic view of the capabilities of the U.S. The 
United States is viewed as powerless either to deter Sukarno from his 
communization policies or to resuscitate the ineffectual countervailing 
forces. Only the removal of Sukarno can prevent the eventual legal 
accession to power of the PKI, but "crude and violent measures" are not 
acceptable instruments of U.S. policy. In short, the situation is fun­
damentally hopeless.
The D P P ’s Policy Recommendations
Consistent with its basic assumptions, the DDP views the Indone­
sian president as the crucial factor in weighing the merits of proposed 
changes in U.S. policy. The DDP paper broadly identifies and evaluates 
three major alternative policies for dealing with Sukarno. In the 
D D P ’s own terms, these are designated: "appeasement," "a hardening
posture, without hostility," and "crude and violent intervention." In 
assessing these alternatives, the DDP seems obsessed with discrediting 
"appeasement," in other words, the policy of seeking an accommodation 
with Sukarno. But while unrelenting and concrete in its criticisms of 
"appeasement," the DDP is less emphatic and less clear about its own 
policy preferences. It appears finally to embrace, without enthusiasm, 
"a hardening posture, without hostility" and to reject "crude and vio­
lent intervention." There remains, however, at least a note of uncer­
tainty about the firmness of the D D P ’s disavowal of the very methods 
that are its peculiar professional area of expertise.
Rejection of Appeasement
The D D P ’s preoccupation with disparaging Ambassador Jones’s pro­
posals for accommodation with Sukarno can be seen even in the opening
37For the shift of U.S. policy in April 1958, see Jones, Indonesia> chaps. 5-7, 
especially pp. 121-27.
38The emotional, even paranoid view of Sukarno in Attachment A closely paral­
lels the views dominant in the CIA and apparently in the State Department in the fall 
of 1957 at the time of the formation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to plan DDP 
covert actions in support of the anti-Sukarno regional rebellions. The only published 
account drawing on internal State Department documents from this period is Allison, 
Ambassador from the Prairiey chap. 11, especially pp. 307-15. For a dramatically 
contrasting assessment of Sukarno’s grievances against the U.S. and the prospects of 
appealing to his vanity, see Jones, Indonesia, pp. 181-84.
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paragraphs devoted to assessing Indonesian politics rather than debat­
ing policy. In a thinly veiled attack on Jones, the DDP abruptly warns 
that "even . . . achievement of a modus vivendi between the United 
States and Sukarno could not stave offM eventual PKI accession to power 
by acclamation (par. 2).
West Irian
Deferring further disparagement of Jones’s general accommodation- 
ist posture, the DDP turns in paragraph 4 to attacking Jones’s position 
on the most pressing policy question that was confronting American 
policymakers in early 1961: what stand the U.S. should take on the
rapidly escalating Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West Irian.39 This 
dispute had reached a dangerous turning point in January 1961 with the 
Indonesians’ acquisition of $400 million in arms from the Soviet Union. 
The CIA estimate that by the end of 1961 the military advantage would 
pass from the Dutch to the Indonesians raised the ’’specter” of a 
Soviet-armed Indonesia attacking Dutch positions in West Irian.40 
Viewing this eventuality as catastrophic for the free world, Ambassador 
Jones’s cables to Washington repeatedly conveyed the urgency of an ac­
tive U.S. role in achieving a prompt settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian 
quarrel.41 For Jones this meant U.S. intervention to insure that Indo­
nesia secured West Irian. Not only was such action seen as essential 
to any viable long-term settlement, but, Jones believed, the removal 
of the West Irian dispute from Indonesian domestic politics was the key 
to checking Indonesia’s drift toward communism.
Ambassador Jones would have been pleased by the DDP’s initial com­
ment on the West Irian issue. Recognizing the credibility of ’’the 
threat of war between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian” 
(par. 4), the DDP tacitly conceded that Sukarno’s shrewd coercive 
diplomacy, backed by the massive new arms agreement with the Soviet 
Union, had fundamentally altered the terms of a dispute that had been 
stalemated since 1950. As Jones and his Embassy staff correctly calcu­
lated, only the threat of war would jolt Washington into altering its 
long-standing policy of ’’impartiality” or passive neutrality.42 Just 
as the Europeanist State Department had already the previous fall begun 
responding to Jones’s urgings by shifting from passive to active neu­
trality,43 so now the intensely Sukarnophobe DDP conceded for the first 
time that the U.S. ’’may be forced to abandon” impartiality for involve­
39In addition to Henderson, West New Guinea, see the moderately pro-Indonesian 
interpretation of the evolution of the dispute in Robert C. Bone, Jr., The Dynamics 
of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1958). Compare the pro-Dutch interpretation given in Justus M. van der 
Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958).
4°For reference to this critical assumption, see Dean Rusk Memorandum for the 
President, ’’Subject: Proposal for Dealing with the Dutch-Indonesian Dispute over West 
New Guinea (West Irian),” April 3, 1961, NSF:CO--West New Guinea.
41For the Ambassador’s cables on West Irian in early 1961, see Jones, Indone­
sia, pp. 188-93. Compare Allison’s efforts to change Washington’s stance on West 
Irian in 1957 in Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, pp. 328-44.
42Jones, Indonesia, p. 191. 43See footnote 45 below.
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ment should the crisis deepen (par. 4). This shift would in turn re­
quire the U.S. to take a stand on "the validity of Indonesia's claim 
to sovereignty over West Irian." Having raised this probability, the 
DDP quickly dismisses the relevance of assaying "the legal merits" by 
contending that the two protagonists view the ownership issue "as a 
bare contest of power" (par. 5). Although self-conscious about this 
apparent "simplification" of the issue, the DDP analyst is clearly ob­
sessed with moving to the heart of the DDP brief on West Irian--and, 
very likely, the most urgent DDP priority in the.jousting for influence 
over Kennedy's approach to Sukarno's April visit.
In the longest single paragraph on the West Irian question, as 
well as in the entire paper, the DDP confronts Ambassador Jones's West 
Irian policy on the grounds that are most decisive in the thinking of 
all the official participants in the policy debate--"the security in­
terests of the United States" (par. 6). Having already voiced the 
general warning that Jones's proposed rapprochement with Sukarno would 
not alleviate the central problem of Indonesian vulnerability to commu­
nism, the DDP now seeks to demonstrate the perils in the main step in 
Jones's rapprochement strategy. "We believe that accession to Indone­
sia's claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve the best 
interests of United States security in that part of the world. . . .
In sum, by backing Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian, 
we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately 
antagonistic toward the United States" (par. 6). The consequences of 
the Ambassador's policy are thus seen not only as futile, but even 
counterproductive.
The five contentions presented by the DDP to bolster this conclu­
sion conflicted with the key assumptions of the accommodationists, in­
cluding, in part, the views of the Director of the DDI. In predicting 
the likely course of Sukarno's foreign policy after he had secured West 
Irian with American diplomatic help, the DDP warned that Sukarno would 
reward the U.S. for its help by "cementing relations with the Soviet 
Union" and by embarking on "further irredentist ventures" (par. 6).
This forecast directly contradicted the calculations of the pragmatic 
accommodationists, as well as the sometimes idealistic hopes of the 
Ambassador, that Sukarno could be enticed by the U.S. initiative into 
devoting himself to domestic economic development and adopting a 
western-oriented nonalignment stance abroad.
While Ambassador Jones was, in fact, more sanguine than he con­
cedes in his memoirs about beneficial consequences of Sukarno's secur­
ing West Irian with U.S. diplomatic assistance, he was at the time more 
directly concerned with the alleged domestic political impact of U.S. 
diplomatic intervention. Here, by contrast, the DDP underscores its 
earlier appraisal of the growing ineffectiveness of the Indonesian 
military as an anticommunist force--so long, at least, as Sukarno con­
tinued to be successful in neutralizing the army's sporadic anticommu­
nist maneuvers. While Jones was painfully aware of the army's politi­
cal weaknesses, including the chronic vacillation of Army Chief of 
Staff, General Nasution, noted in the DDP's Attachment B, he was more 
hopeful about the army's overall prospects, especially if the West 
Irian issue could be settled. In short, Jones remained an exponent of 
what the DDP regarded as the faulty thesis that the Indonesian army 
would ultimately rescue Indonesia from the communist abyss (par. Bl).
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Very probably unknown to Ambassador Jones at the time was the 
strong parallel position enunciated by the CIA's Deputy Director for 
Intelligence, Robert Amory. Reflecting a major cleavage between DDI 
and DDP assessments of Indonesian politics, Amory's views directly 
challenged the DDP's pessimism about the prospects of the army and 
other anticommunist forces in the wake of Indonesia's acquisition of 
West Irian.
That brings me to the principal basic question of the object of the 
exercise. This I envisage to be the elimination from Indonesian 
politics of the issue on which, to our discomfort, Sukarno, the Com­
munists, and the Army are united. This can only be accomplished by, 
in effect, assuring the accession to Indonesia of Irian at a date 
sufficiently near in the future to cause the Indonesians to feel that 
the battle in principle is won. This will, of course, redound to 
Sukarno's credit, which is too bad. But, most importantly, once it 
has come about the bonds which now link the Army to Sukarno and in­
hibit all its efforts to counter his increasing accommodation of the 
Communists will loosen, if not disappear. In time the fundamental 
antipathy of the military and the Moslem hierarchy to Communism will 
emerge and give us a lever by which Indonesia may be guided into 
Indian-style genuine neutrality.44
The DDP concludes its assault on the political assumptions behind 
the accommodationist policy on West Irian by announcing support for the 
only concrete proposal formally under consideration in Washington. 
Originating in the wake of the State Department's reassessment of West 
Irian policy in November 1960, this proposal called for a United Nations 
trusteeship for West Irian. Reaffirmed in a memorandum authored by 
George McGhee, the State Department's Counselor, in mid-February, the 
U.N. trusteeship concept was emerging as the fallback position of those 
eager to avoid war but opposed to Indonesia's acquisition of West 
Irian.45 In the formal recommendation section of the memorandum,
McGhee urged:
3. Initiate as soon as possible confidential discussions first 
with the U.S. Secretary-General and then on the highest possible 
level with the Dutch, Indonesians, Canadians, Malayans, Indians, and 
British with a view to obtaining their agreement in principle to the 
establishment of a U.N.-administered trusteeship for West New Guinea. 
Discussions with the Dutch should be timed to occur two days before 
a meeting to be arranged in advance between our Ambassador and 
Sukarno.
a) Discussions with the Dutch should include a detailed review 
emphasizing our increased concern at the deteriorating situation, 
our estimate of the consequences of inaction and our determination 
to take steps in the direction of an eventual resolution of the
44Robert Amory memorandum for George McGhee: "Comments on Memorandum of Febru­
ary 15: 'Possible U.N. Resolution on West New Guinea,'" February 20, 1961, NSF:C0-- 
West New Guinea.
45This key memorandum describes the fall 1960 shift of U.S. policy away from 
passive neutrality and advances' justifications for the U.N. trusteeship proposal.
See George McGhee memorandum to Secretary Rusk: "Possible United Nations Resolution 
on West New Guinea," February 15, 1961, NSF:CO--West New Guinea.
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problem. We should also let the Dutch know that the U.S. response to 
Indonesian attack on West New Guinea would be within the context of 
our responsibilities under the Charter to support U.N. action against 
aggression.
b) In discussions with Sukarno we should take the following line:
The Dutch are in effective physical possession and control of West 
New Guinea. It appears impossible to get a direct transfer of the 
territory to Indonesia. The proposal for a trusteeship would (1) give 
the Indonesians a much greater opportunity to attempt to accomplish 
their purpose in the United Nations than they would have in the ab­
sence of a trusteeship, and (2) afford much greater freedom for both 
the Indonesians and the people of West New Guinea to form closer re­
lationships.
The center of Dutch support in Washington was still, of course, 
the EUR. Both loyalty to a faithful Dutch ally and the politico-stra­
tegic imperative of NATO unity in the face of renewed Soviet pressures 
on Berlin reinforced the EU R ’s general Europeanist outlook. By mid- 
February, however, following the shifts evident in the position of even 
the intensely anti-Sukarno Dutch Minister Luns, EUR came to favor the 
concept of a Dutch transfer of West Irian to U.N. trusteeship.^6
Although the DDP paper reflects little of this orthodox European­
ist orientation of the EUR, the analogy between Sukarno and Hitler 
(par. Al) does suggest an uncritical transfer of Western European "les­
sons of history" to an Asian setting. Far more decisive, however, in 
shaping the DDP perspective on West Irian was, again, its hatred for 
Sukarno. Despite the divergent roots of their attitudes, the DDP and 
the EUR both attach similar conditions to their approval of the State 
Departments U.N. trusteeship proposal. After applauding its virtues 
in "defusing the West Irian time bomb" and relieving the U.S. of the 
incubus of siding with the Dutch on a colonialist issue, the DDP is 
unequivocal on the two issues most salient among the Dutch supporters. 
The United States had to oppose vigorously any resolution of the issue 
involving either Indonesian use of arms or compromising on self-deter­
mination procedures (par. 7).
Anticipating the Ambassador’s objection that "the Sukarno regime" 
would balk at conditions which had the clear intent and effect of deny­
ing Indonesia control of West Irian, the DDP assigns the U.S. the role 
of imposing these terms on Indonesia. Purposely ambiguous about just 
how this might be done, the D D P ’s militant language certainly suggests 
at the very least that Washington should renew Secretary Dulles’s 1958 
pledge to Dutch Foreign Minister Luns, to provide the Dutch with logistical 
support in the event of an Indonesian attack on West I r i a n . C e r t a i n l y
z+6For the leading analysis of Dutch governmental, political and press opinion 
on West Irian, see Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization (New Haven: Yale Uni­
versity Press, 1966).
**7The high priority that Foreign Minister Luns attached to securing President 
Kennedy’s reaffirmation of Secretary Dulles * s pledge is dramatically revealed in the 
record of Luns’s meeting with Kennedy on April 10, 1961. Also revealed in that same 
record is the Kennedy administration’s determined effort to retreat from the Dulles 
pledge to a refusal to provide military assistance outside the framework of the United 
Nations. See Dean Rusk Memorandum to John F. Kennedy: "Call by Dutch Foreign Minister 
Luns," especially fourth attachment: "Talking Points re West New Guinea Issue,"
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a verbal warning alone would not meet the DDP insistence that the U.S. 
’’confront [Sukarno] with unmistakable manifestations of United States 
resolve not to permit a settlement of the West Irian issue by force of 
arms, . . . ” Whatever the intent of the DPP, however, the Kennedy ad­
ministration was determined to avoid being drawn into an armed conflict 
in support of what would be widely seen as the colonialist position.
On the question of adherence to self-detemrination procedures, the 
DDP again calls for Mvigorous opposition” to any compromise. This DDP 
position seems to have appealed not only to Europeanists and Sukarno- 
phobes, but to ’’idealists” like Secretary Rusk, the most influential 
and persistent spokesman for the principle of self-determination.
While not prominent in the spring phase of the debate, two other cham­
pions of the principle of self-determination expressed both their per­
sonal convictions and the perspectives inherent in their bureaucratic 
roles at the United Nations. Both Adlai Stevenson (the Cabinet-level 
Ambassador to the U.N.) and Harlan Cleveland (the Assistant Secretary 
for International Organization Affairs) had by early April begun to 
raise their voices in what became a sustained campaign throughout the 
year to resist U.S. compromising on self-determination for the inhabi­
tants of West Irian.
Just as the administration did not exhibit a monolithic position 
on the degree of U.S. interest in preventing Indonesia from using 
force, so it soon found itself split on the application of the princi­
ple of self-determination. While virtually all American policymakers 
felt an emotional attachment to a principle that was deeply ingrained 
in the dominant American ideology, many resisted its absolutist appli­
cation in the case of West Irian. A few, like Ambassador Jones and 
some of his academic allies, were familiar enough with the long history 
of the West Irian dispute to know that the Indonesians in fact had a 
cogent position on the self-determination issue. Leaving aside the 
question of Dutch abuse of that principle in refusing for over a decade 
either to negotiate with Indonesia on the issue or to initiate steps 
toward self-determination within West Irian, the Indonesians argued 
that the West Irianese had already exercised their right of self-deter­
mination when the Dutch East Indies received its independence as the 
Indonesian state in 1950.49
Pragmatic realpolitik was, however, the primary basis for the 
position of Ambassador Jones and his allies in the internal debate. 
Apart from his staunch friends on the Indonesia desk, Jones enjoyed 
strategically placed backing from two of Walt Rostow’s White House 
assistants, Robert Komer and Robert Johnson.50 With varying degrees 
of reluctance they had concluded that the principle of self-determina­
tion must be sacrificed before the intertwined imperatives of avoiding 
war and the expansion of communist influence in Indonesia. For these 
pragmatists the U.N. trusteeship concept was seen as acceptable only 
if it could be transformed into a vehicle for achieving their primary
undated [April 1961], Presidents Office Files, Country Series--Netherlands. See 
John F. Kennedy and Dutch Foreign Minister Luns: ’’Memorandum of Conversation Concern­
ing West New Guines,” April 10, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia. Also see Jones, Indonesia, 
pp. 198-99.
^8See footnote 19 above. 49See Henderson, West New Guinea, p. 46.
50See especially footnotes 32-34 above.
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policy aim, i.e., the most rapid possible transfer of West Irian to 
Indonesian control with only a token observance of self-determination 
procedures. Certainly this was the posture Komer advocated in his 
blunt critique of the State Department’s proposal in early April:
Walt--
I confess great puzzlement over State’s West New Guinea memo to 
the President. It now puts the issue clearly but comes up with no 
commensurate solution. If the prime reason for a policy shift is to 
keep Indonesia from sliding away, we must come up with a solution 
which is broadly satisfactory to the Indonesians. If we do not, we 
merely let ourselves in for a peck of trouble without gaining the 
advantage which led us to move in the first place.
Unfortunately, State’s proposal is about the minimum movement we 
can make. [censored]. Why move at all in this case?
Of course, if we are proposing trusteeship [censored] it might 
make sense. But if this is the case, why not tell the President?
And why not spell out how the proposal (e.g., a plebiscite in three 
years) could be used to convince Sukarno that we are really moving in 
his direction.
The trouble with State is that it never thinks these problems 
through to the end. I’m sure we all agree that Indonesia will even­
tually get WNG, that we cannot afford to buck Sukarno on this issue 
while the Soviets back him [censored]. But we always enter these 
painful transitions with a little move that stirs up a ruckus and 
leads us from crisis to crisis before the issue is resolved in the 
way we knew it would be in the first place, but with all parties mad 
at us.51
While finally taking a position closely parallel to Komer’s,
Robert Amory, Director of the CIA’s DDI (where Komer served prior to 
1961), qualified his firm recommendation for transfer to Indonesia with 
insistence on formal adherence to the self-determination principle:
I believe we can have no morally justifiable position short of a 
properly supervised plebiscite, farcical as that will be considering 
the stone age level of the West New Guineans. Indonesia has no claim 
ethnically to their allegiance and certainly has shown no administra­
tive capability that would justify turning the Irians [sic] over to 
them as wards. Thus, our room for maneuver seems limited to the 
question of duration, and I would suggest we start at ten years and 
be willing to slide to five, or even three.52
51See Robert Komer letter to Walt Rostow, April 5, 1961, NSF:CO--West New 
Guinea. Compare Robert Johnson memorandum for Walt Rostow, April 7, 1961, NSF:CO-- 
West New Guinea.
52For Amory*s unequivocal support for transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, see 
the remarks quoted above on p. 145. Amory’s full reaction to the U.N. trusteeship 
proposal appears in his memorandum for George McGhee: "Comments on Memorandum of 
February 15: ’Possible UN Resolution on West New Guinea,11’ February 20, 1961, NSF:C0 
--West New Guinea.
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Military and Economic Aid as the Core of 
a Two-Level Post-West Irian Strategy
The interest of the pragmatic accommodationists in securing West 
Irian for Indonesia derived from long-term hopes as well as short-term 
imperatives. If the West Irian issue could be settled quickly to Indo­
n e s i a ^  satisfaction, there was the possibility of launching a two- 
level post-West Irian strategy to channel Indonesian energies into more 
"constructive" channels.53 The overt level envisioned a comprehensive 
western program of economic assistance designed to lure Sukarno away 
from foreign adventures and into domestic development. Concurrently, 
a more modest and less overt program of military (and police) assis­
tance would seek to strengthen both the capabilities of conservative 
security forces and the intimacy of their ties to the American mili­
tary. While few of the accommodationists shared the high optimism of 
Ambassador Jones about the overt strategy of wooing Sukarno, all of 
them viewed military assistance as indispensable for ensuring that the 
army would not only check any PKI move to seize power, but also rule a 
post-Sukarno Indonesia.
As already noted, the DDP evinced deep skepticism about the feasi­
bility of both levels of this long-term accommodationist strategy, as 
well as the wisdom of responding to short-term imperatives to win West 
Irian for Sukarno. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in turning 
to the issue of military and economic assistance, the DDP again regis­
ters adamant opposition to Jones1 s renewed pleas for Washington to coun­
ter Soviet aid diplomacy by continuing "a moderate program of economic 
and military assistance sufficient to bolster the political position 
of our friends within Indonesia . . ." (par. 8). Consistent with this 
posture, Jones had argued the previous October that the U.S. should 
satisfy enough of the Indonesian armyfs request for arms to stop it 
from turning to Moscow.* 5** Washington’s decision then was to respond 
instead to Dutch pleas not to arm an aggressive Sukarno. Indeed, 
Washington had gone even further by quietly slowing the delivery of 
modest small arms supplies already committed to Indonesia. Now in the 
wake of General Nasution’s January arms deal with the USSR, Jones re­
vived his appeal for resumption of a moderate level of aid. Despite 
its desire to inspire the Indonesian army to move more firmly against 
the Indonesian communists, the DDP felt that military aid entailed not 
only the same risks associated with diplomatic support to Sukarno on 
West Irian, but illusions about U.S. influence in the post-West Irian 
period. "We are disposed to argue that our national policy should be 
to treat Indonesia as a case in which appeasement, whether by word or 
by deed, will buy us nothing. Hence to propose stepped up aid as a 
blueprint for future action simply begs the question whether Communist 
ascendancy in Indonesia can be curbed as long as Sukarno remains in 
power. We believe it cannot" (par. 8).
The DPP’s Expressed Preference 
for a "Hardening" Posture
Despite what could be read as an implicit policy recommendation 
to remove Sukarno from power, the DDP analyst immediately warns that
53See my "Kennedy Initiatives."
5**Ambassador Jones’ views of the evolving arms aid issue in 1960-61 appear in 
his Indonesia> pp. 189-93.
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there is very little that the U.S. can do to accomplish that objective. 
In a gloomy lecture on the "extremely limited influence" of the U.S. 
in Indonesia, the DDP seems resigned to a grim limits-of-power perspec­
tive that clashes with the DDP's professional proclivity for an active, 
interventionist policy (as evidenced by its contemporary operations in 
Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam). Moreover, the emphatic and deeply 
pessimistic language of the DDP departs from the confident, activist 
style of the new "tough-minded" Kennedy advisers.
It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course of 
action by the United States which would stand a good chance of turn­
ing the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive direction. 
Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence that the 
United States can exert, at least in the short run, is extremely lim­
ited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is ex­
cluded. Any "carrot" in the form of economic or military aid or 
diplomatic support that is freely given will (for reasons set forth 
above) be used simply to consolidate an essentially unacceptable 
regime. Any "stick" the United States would be willing to use would 
be too feeble to destroy the regime and would simply accelerate the 
process of disorganization which (it is argued above) is the probable 
prelude to a constitutional Communist take-over. [Par. 9]
Before attempting to account for this extraordinary DDP pessimism, 
it is instructive to note the modest claims the DDP makes for what it 
endorses as "the least unsatisfactory policy for the United States" 
(par. 9). By "a hardening in our posture, without overtones of hostil­
ity or anger," the DDP policy hopes "to alert the conservative elements 
among Indonesian leadership to the ineluctable necessity of choosing 
between absorption by the Communist Bloc and associations [sic] as an 
equal within the comity of free Western and Asian nations" (par. 10). 
Especially when the DDP defines the political stakes in the stark al­
ternatives of their militant cold war ideology, the question arises 
again as to why the DDP is prepared to conclude that there is so little 
that could be done to get rid of Sukarno.
To answer that critical question, two contrary interpretations 
must be considered. The first is that the DDP*s restraint was primar­
ily a reaction to its abortive intervention in 1957-58 on the side of 
regional dissidents. The second contends that circumstantial evidence 
requires further inquiry as to whether the DDP paper represents a 
subtle effort to promote the very crude and violent measures it osten­
sibly rejects.
The DPP's Ostensible Rejection 
of Crude and Violent Measures
The credibility of the D D P ?s apparent renunciation of crude and 
violent intervention in Indonesia rests not only on the D D P fs own 
words, but also on the likelihood that Washington policymakers were 
then skeptical about the feasibility of launching covert operations in 
Indonesia.
That skepticism stemmed, first and foremost, from the DDP's abor­
tive efforts in 1957-58 to support the unsuccessful regional rebellions
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against Sukarno.55 Although only alluded to obliquely in the memoran­
dum (par. A2), that debacle had sensitized many--though not all--the 
DDP staff to the risks involved in external manipulation of complex 
and volatile Indonesian politics.56 Moreover, regardless of its own 
preferences, the DDP surely recognized that the foreign policy bureau­
cracy would react to any renewed DDP pleas for action with considerable 
reserve. Even the intimate Tuesday lunch group and the Special Group, 
the NSC subcommittee responsible for authorizing covert action, would 
presumably balk, in view of a very recent failure that had left the 
U.S., by the DDP’s own judgment, "virtually bereft" of political assets 
in Indonesia (par. B 4 ) .
A further legacy of the abortive 1958 intervention argued even 
more powerfully against any new DDP operations. The case of the Ameri­
can pilot, Allen Pope, was still so diplomatically sensitive that the 
DDP avoided mentioning it even in this secret memorandum. Character­
ized officially by President Eisenhower as "a soldier of fortune," Pope 
was captured by Indonesian authorities after his plane was shot down 
during a bombing raid on Ambon in April 1958. Subsequently tried and 
sentenced to death as an enemy of the state, Pope still remained in a 
Jakarta prison awaiting Sukarno1s decision whether or not to carry out 
the sentence. As both governments recognized, Indonesia’s capture of 
Pope provided Sukarno with the means to put significant pressure on 
the U.S. government. While that pressure by itself could not produce 
substantive policy initiatives, it could function as another deterrent 
against any further CIA clandestine operations. Finally, as is now 
evident from a declassified top secret memorandum from the CIA Director 
Allen Dulles to President Kennedy in early April, the Agency itself 
attached substantial importance to winning the release of a loyal em­
ployee .57
Apart from the impact of the 1958 debacle on both the real and 
perceived prospects for DDP plotting in Indonesia, the DDP shared the 
crisis-centeredness which affected the entire foreign policy bureaucra­
cy. Already preoccupied with major paramilitary activities, as well
55Prof. George McT. Kahin is currently writing a book that will provide the 
first comprehensive analysis of the motives behind and the political consequences of 
the American intervention in the 1957-58 rebellion. In the interim, the best docu­
mented but still fragmentary accounts of U.S. policy in 1957-58 are to be found in 
Jones, Indonesia> pp. 113-56, and Allison, Ambassador from the Prairiepp. 293-344. 
Among the many secondary accounts, see especially the succinct summary, based on 
Indonesian public and private sources, in Daniel S. Lev, "America, Indonesia, and 
the Rebellion of 1958," United Asia, 17 (July-August 1965), pp. 305-9. Also see 
James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961); and William Steven­
son, Birds ' Nests in Their Beards (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).
56Former U.S. officials inside the CIA and in other agencies have told me of 
the caution engendered in all but a few of the DDP*s personnel responsible for Indo­
nesian affairs.
57The CIAfs declassification of the Dulles memorandum on Pope provides the 
first public admission by the CIA of its covert support for the rebellion--not only 
its employment of Pope, but its covert "political-action program" in support of "the 
anti-Communist, pro-West dissident movement" in Indonesia in 1957-58. See Allen 
Dulles1s memorandum for Brig. General Chester V. Clifton, military aide to the Presi­
dent, "Allen L. Pope," April 7, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia. Given the significance of 
this document, it has been included as an appendix to this article. See below pp. 
167-69.
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as with political operations in Cuba, Laos, and the Congo, there was 
an instinctive reluctance in the DDP to stretch already overextended 
resources to assume the risks of even a modest scheme against Sukarno. 
Closely related was the tendency already evident in the Southeast Asia 
branch of the D D P ’s Far Eastern Division to view the crises in Laos 
and Vietnam as an excuse for avoiding involvement in Indonesia--even 
though, at least in retrospect, DDP Director Bissell readily concedes 
Indonesia’s greater political and strategic significance for the United 
States. Probably troubled by an enforced passivity in the face of 
the deteriorating situation in Indonesia, the DDP also manifested, 
along with other agencies, a tendency to escalate its estimate of the 
stakes involved in checking communism in Indochina.58
Despite the plausibility of the thesis that the DDP was genuinely 
resigned to the necessity of avoiding crude and violent measures, 
attention must be accorded a contrary conjecture, also based on both a 
reading of the DDP paper and its bureaucratic context.
Most important is the nagging suspicion that the implicit recom­
mendation of the D D P ’s analysis is to take immediate action to remove 
the root of the Indonesia problem--Sukarno. But what action? For the 
analysis systematically discredits the effectiveness of all the major 
measures mooted for checking Sukarno and communism. Revival of the 
regional dissidents is hopeless; the army remains at best a highly 
problematic countervailing force; and the U.S. is virtually bereft of 
influence, with no effective ’’carrots” or ’’sticks” --except for those 
’’sticks” which it ’’must be assumed are excluded.” In short, Sukarno 
is the problem: yet there are no viable means to deal with him, except
those crude and violent measures which are ruled out.
Confronted with this analysis, any official imbued with the new 
president’s determination to meet the expanding Soviet challenge on 
the Third World cold war battleground would be likely to insist on re­
examining the prohibition on crude and violent measures. Certainly 
the DDP invites such a reexamination by signaling its own unhappiness 
with Washington’s apparent refusal further to sustain the dissident 
regionalist movements (par. B 2 ) . Although the DDP asserts that by 
1961 it is too late to resuscitate these movements, the implication is 
that a more astute U.S. policy would have been to continue to support 
them--presumably at least with funds--as a potential asset when a 
changed situation permitted some form of renewed political action 
against Sukarno.
The availability of assassination in 1961 as an extraordinary and 
yet logistically simple form of intervention also forces some revalua­
tion of the D D P ’s policy posture. Although understandable not m e n ­
tioned in the memorandum, the D D P ’s approval and practice of assassi­
nation in the early Kennedy years is well established. The Church 
Committee has documented DDP assassination plots directed at Lumumba, 
Trujillo, and Castro in this period.59 Even more notable is the testi­
mony of former DDP Director Bissell that the CIA also plotted the 
assassination of Sukarno. In the only published lines from that testi­
mony, the Committee reports: ’’Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard
58Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973.
59Church Committee, Report on Assassination Riots.
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Bissell testified that the assassination of Sukarno had been ’contem­
plated1 by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no farther than 
identifying an ’asset’ whom it was believed might be recruited to kill 
Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia, but, 
according to Bissell, those arms were not intended for assassination 
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 89).”60
If one argues that the DD P ’s real intent was to urge immediate 
and violent action against Sukarno, how can one account for the at best 
highly ambiguous presentation of their views? The most likely explana­
tion of course would be the severe bureaucratic constraints on such 
candor. As already noted, the DDP was presumably acutely aware of the 
widespread tendency in the foreign policy bureaucracy to blame the DDP 
for the 1958 debacle and to be suspicious of new DDP proposals. More­
over, as the Church Committee has also shown, proposals for covert 
action--let alone for assassination--are not necessarily set down in 
written memoranda. Calculated ambiguity serves not only to preserve 
secrecy, but also to obscure responsibility.61 Finally, there is the 
possibility--for which, however, there is no direct evidence in this 
instance-- that the DDP chose to circumvent the Special Group altogether 
and plan covert operations independently of that formal executive 
authority.
Conclusion— The Influence of the DDP/Hard-line Position
The President’s Posture during Sukarno’s Visit
Whatever the degree of toughness preferred--and practiced--by the 
DDP, President Kennedy in his meeting with President Sukarno in late 
April began to embrace the main ingredients of the accommodationist 
strategy which the DDP paper decried so bitterly as ’’appeasement.” 
While his views were much closer to the cautious version of accommoda­
tion urged by his White House aides than the more optimistic version 
represented by Ambassador Jones’s hopes for a ’’new era” in U.S.-Indo­
nesian relations, the president was willing to take the first steps in 
testing the wisdom of Jones’s assumptions about both Sukarno and the 
army.
Although he carried through an assiduously planned personal effort 
to appeal to Sukarno’s vanity, Kennedy did appear to bow temporarily 
to the Dutch and the DDP-EUR hard-liners by deferring the tangible pol­
icy initiatives sought by Ambassador Jones. On economic aid, for in­
stance, he made only a heavily qualified offer to assist Indonesia’s 
newly proclaimed eight-year development plan. A comparable modest 
initiative in military assistance for civic action seemed certain to 
win Kennedy’s eventual endorsement, but again implementation was post­
poned. Ostensibly the same pattern of modest gestures but delayed sub­
stantial initiatives seemed to prevail on the central issue of West 
Irian. It is notable that despite Sukarno’s willingness to pledge 
Pope’s release, the Indonesian leader did not impress Kennedy favor­
ably. In fact, Kennedy developed a strong dislike for a man whom
eoIbid.y p. 4.
61Tbid., especially pp. 6-9 and 260-81, concerning "Findings and Conclusions 
Relating to Authorization and Control.”
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he viewed as morally corrupt, not only for his widely publicized phi­
landering (which had offended Secretary Rusk and others) but also for 
his apparent indifference to the well-being of his then 100 million 
people. Unlike the DDP, however, the president did not permit his 
personal antipathies to influence his policy judgment.62
The DDP and EUR may have taken solace in this lack of major 
changes in U.S. policy toward Indonesia, as well as in Kennedy’s new 
personal dislike for Sukarno. Yet, as already evident from the dis­
cussion at the outset of this commentary, even in April 1961 the 
trends in U.S. bureaucratic politics were definitely moving toward 
pragmatic accommodation. Reinforcing those bureaucratic changes were 
the dispositions of President Kennedy himself.
The President’s Dispositions63
As reflected both in the rhetoric of his inaugural address and in 
his initial actions in Laos, Cuba, and the Congo, President Kennedy 
attached the most urgent priority to meeting what he perceived as an 
awesome challenge from a monolithic communism expanding into the Third 
World. As manifested in his rapid adoption of a more sophisticated 
and costly military strategy of flexible response, he acted decisively 
in 1961 to strengthen what might be called the Third World frontiers 
of the informal American empire. Especially in 1961-62 Kennedy seems 
to have been very much a part of a cold war ambience which, the Church 
Committee found, led many of the most respected American officials to 
believe that assassination ’’was in the best interests of the country.” 
Accordingly, one is inclined to conclude that Kennedy’s preference for 
noncoercive strategies in Indonesia did not derive from any special 
moral repugnance for ’’crude and violent” measures, so long as they 
could be justified by the cause of ’’the free world.”
Congruent with this conjecture about Kennedy’s probable adherence 
to conventional cold war morality is the contention of James MacGregor 
Burns, his most perceptive biographer, that Kennedy lacked firm moral 
commitments. At the same time, some revisionists tend to be unfair to 
Kennedy in discounting other dimensions of his approach to foreign 
policy, especially in the Third World. Certainly compared to Eisen­
hower and Dulles, if not to Stevenson and Bowles, Kennedy exhibited 
understanding of and sympathy for Third World nationalism, neutralism, 
and nonviolent social revolution.
While not as salient as his cold war instincts, Kennedy’s under-., 
standing and sympathy were probably necessary, if by no means suffi­
cient, preconditions for his opting for the strategy of accommodation. 
Finally, Kennedy’s intensely activist personal style should not be 
overlooked. He welcomed opportunities to test out the new theories of 
economic development and counterinsurgency, just as he warmed to the 
personal challenge of dealing with other heads of state as well as his 
own policy advisers-- including those from the DDP.
62Rostow, Diffusion of P o w e r pp. 192-96. Also supplemented by interview with 
Prof. Rostow, July 1976.
63This section draws on a wide range of sources, some of which are noted above 
in footnotes 9 and 10.
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The Ascendancy of the 
Accommodationists ifT~ 
the Kennedy Years
Not until December 1961 would the confluence of these presidential 
dispositions with Sukarno’s military escalation and the shuffling of 
high-level White House and State Department officials produce a formal, 
public U.S. decision to intervene diplomatically in the Dutch-Indone­
sian dispute over West Irian. Beneath the surface, however, it had 
been clear for some time to all the policy insiders that the U.S. had 
recognized that West Irian must go to Indonesia even if Irianese self- 
determination had to be pro forma. That decision in turn signaled the 
rise of the accommodationists to ascendancy as architects of Kennedy’s 
ambitious initiatives for channeling Sukarno’s radical nationalism into 
constructive domestic development. Not until over three years later, 
in the summer of 1964, amid both escalation of the U.S. war in Vietnam 
and Indonesia’s budding alliance with China, did the hard-liners 
achieve parity, if not ascendancy, in American policy formulation.6  ^
Whether the revival of the hard-line orientation in 1964-65 also pro­
duced a revival of the covert actions launched in 1957-58 must await 
the declassification of DDP documents for the months leading up to the 
abortive ’’coup” of October 1, 1965.* 65
6Z+Jones, Indonesia, pp. 293-401.
65For a lucid and fair discussion of the major alternative theories about the 
origins of the ’’coup,” see Harold Crouch, "Another Look at the Indonesian ’Coup,’” 
Indonesia, 15 (April 1973), pp. 1-20.
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Note
Richard Bissell, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Deputy Director 
of Plans in March 1961, ascribes the likely authorship of the secret 
memorandum reproduced here to his subordinate Desmond Fitzgerald, then 
Chief of the Far East Division of the DDP. As indicated in Bissell’s 
cover memorandum, he sent Fitzgerald’s paper to top administration 
foreign policy officials, including McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is thus not sur­
prising that Bundy’s copy of the original memorandum appeared on the 
Kennedy Library’s inventory of Kennedy’s National Security File:
Country Series-- Indonesia. Prepared in 1973 at my request, this inven­
tory of document titles permitted me not only to gauge the significance 
of this document, but to identify it with the precision necessary to 
initiate a formal request to the CIA for ’’mandatory classification re­
view.” By the terms of President Nixon’s post-Pentagon Papers Execu­
tive Order 11652 (March 8, 1972), any classified document more than 
ten years old was henceforth subject to such review. Happily for both 
scholars and the American public, the CIA responded favorably to my 
request. In a letter to the Kennedy Library on September 9, 1973, the 
Agency authorized the declassification of the entire twenty-two page 
document with the minor exception of a brief reference to source mate­
rial on p. 6.
For scholars interested in studying the original document in the 
context of other relevant Indonesia material in the Kennedy period, I 
recommend a trip to the Kennedy Library. Currently housed in the 
Federal Records Center on 380 Trapelo Road in Waltham, Massachusetts, 
the Library is staffed by highly intelligent and responsive archivists 
who can lead the researcher through the intricacies of not only the 
National Security File but a number of other relevant declassified and 
unclassified materials, including an extensive collection of oral his­
tory interviews donated by major officials from the Kennedy period. 
Although manifestly less valuable than the Library itself, the Carroll­
ton Press’s Declassified Documents Reference System now provides ready 
access to microfiche copies of the originals, as well as a useful index 
to newly released documents.
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P. 1 22 March 1961
SUBJECT: Indonesian Perspectives
1. Indonesia’s growing vulnerability to communism stems 
from the distinctive bias of Sukarno’s global orientation, as 
well as from his domestic policies. The former propels that 
country toward the Soviet orbit. The latter sap the political 
foundation of any organized attempt to deny the Communist Party 
a mass base, strive to neutralize the Indonesian Army as a force 
opposing communism, and permit economic maladministration to 
stifle all constructive impulses toward improving the lot of the 
Indonesian people. Dissident movements on Java and the outlying 
islands, which have a basically anti-Communist orientation, have 
been permitted to wither from lack of sustenance. They are now 
virtually on their last legs and no longer represent a viable 
force in being. In Attachment B to this paper, entitled ’’Coun­
tervailing Forces?” , we attempt to shed light upon the factors 
which render the Indonesian Army progressively more ineffectual 
in its containment of communism, and present an estimate of dis­
sident strength upon which we base our conclusion that as a 
political power factor it no longer counts.
p. 2 2. Economic factors are likely to play a decisive role in
making Indonesia ripe for a Communist takeover. While it can be 
argued that the vast majority of the rural population of Indone­
sia are impervious to the hardships of life on a bare subsistence 
level, the urban proletariat, especially in Java, may be found 
less supine. An Eight-Year Plan has been launched, predicated 
on the availability of foreign loans on a unrealistic scale of 
magnitude. A growing budgetary load will have to be borne in 
order to fund Indonesia’s preparations for a showdown over West 
Irian. The expansion of Indonesia’s military establishment is 
bound to make heavy inroads into Indonesia’s financial resources. 
Consequently, a continuing and accelerated decline in the eco­
nomic life of Indonesia is very probable. While economic atrophy 
may set the stage for a Communist uprising, we consider it more 
likely that (barring completely unforeseen developments) Sukar­
n o ’s ’’Guided Democracy” will be permitted by the PKI to run its 
natural course. This would enable the Communist Party to take 
over the leadership of Indonesia at a time when radical changes 
in the methods of administering Indonesian domestic affairs be­
come the inescapable alternative to perpetual chaos. Even 
achievement of a modus vivendi between the United States and 
President Sukarno could not stave off such a development.
p. 3 3. While many factors of the Indonesian situation remain
objects of contention, it would be hard to deny Sukarno’s respon­
sibility for the economic decline of Indonesia. That his dic­
tatorship may possibly endure as long as he lives strikes us as 
the crux of the Indonesian problem. In Attachment A of this 
paper, entitled ’’President Sukarno - Key to the Indonesian 
Situation,” we are attempting to throw into more striking relief 
the many insoluble problems besetting Indonesia, which can di­
rectly be traced back to Sukarno’s personality and to the
159
political philosophy that animates him. As we see it, Sukarno’s 
continued leadership of Indonesia--irrespective of his momentary 
friendships with the Bloc or the West--renders Indonesia increas­
ingly more vulnerable to PKI strategy, which is to make its de­
cisive bid for legal power under circumstances of economic and 
political chaos with all other political solutions evidently 
exhausted.
4. The forthcoming talks between Presidents Kennedy and 
Sukarno will take place in the shadow of a threat of war between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian. The United 
States, having thus far observed ’’impartiality" regarding this 
issue, may be forced to abandon this stance, should the crisis 
deepen. With abandonment of ’’impartiality” connoting involve­
ment, the United States Government will have no choice but to 
take a position regarding the validity of Indonesia’s claim to
p. 4 sovereignty over West Irian.
5. This paper does not intend to address itself to the 
legal merits of the respective claims advanced by Indonesia and 
the Netherlands. Both nations have made it abundantly clear 
that they do not consider the ownership issue as ”sub judice” 
but as a bare contest of power, with Indonesia claiming that its 
national independence will necessarily remain incomplete and in 
permanent jeopardy as long as the Netherlands maintains its hold 
over West Irian. We realize that this may be considered a sim­
plification of an issue which has become a highly sensitive in­
ternal political question in both countries, complicated by 
considerations of national pride and ’’face” and by the entire 
history of Dutch-Indonesian relations.
6. Without suggesting that other factors can be ignored 
in determining United States policy regarding West Irian, we 
believe that one important aspect has not as yet been given 
sufficient consideration--namely, how United States interests 
will be affected if Indonesia carries the day and ownership of 
West Irian is awarded to her. We believe that accession to 
Indonesia’s claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve 
the best interests of United States security in that part of the 
world. We consider it likely that Indonesia’s success in this 
particular instance will set in train the launching of further
p. 5 irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in lectures given by 
Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist who, however, is a member 
of the Indonesian cabinet close to President Sukarno. Success 
would be bound to cement relations between Indonesia and the 
USSR, which, in addition to throwing the full weight of its 
political support behind the West Irian campaign, is liberally 
providing Indonesia with military aid specifically designed to 
enable her to oust the Dutch from West Irian by force of arms. 
President Sukarno’s prestige and power in Indonesia and in Asia 
as a whole would grow immeasurably, since nothing succeeds like 
success. Even assuming that it were the weight of United States 
power and prestige which gained Indonesia a bloodless and pres­
tigious victory, we would not gain that country’s respect, let 
alone affection. Indonesia’s leadership would see to it that 
the true record of events would be slanted to substantiate the 
boast that it was the threat of USSR intervention, the leadership
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of President Sukarno and the unflinching support given him by 
the Communist Party which combined in making this victory pos­
sible. Predictions that the Indonesian armed forces, once freed 
from their preoccupations with the Dutch threat, would be able 
to concentrate upon dislodging communism from positions of in­
fluence tend to ignore the demonstrated effectiveness of Presi­
dent Sukarno’s tactics of never allowing the army a sufficient 
breathing spell to consolidate and methodically deploy its
p. 6 political strength in combatting communism. There is nothing
to encourage the belief that President Sukarno intends to aban­
don those tactics once West Irian has been annexed. In sum, by 
backing Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we 
may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately 
antagonistic toward the United States.
7. The proposal of a United Nations trusteeship, which the 
Department of State appears to favor, would go a long way toward 
de-fusing the West Irian time bomb which President Sukarno him­
self has primed. It would present an at least temporary solu­
tion of the problem, permitting the United States to escape the 
opprobrium of having sided with the Netherlands on a ’’colonial- 
ist” issue. However, unless confronted with unmistakable mani­
festations of United States resolve not to permit a settlement 
of the West Irian issue by force of arms, and of our vigorous 
opposition to turning this area over to the Indonesians without 
any observants of self-determination procedures, the Sukarno 
regime would be unlikely to acquiesce in the imposition of such 
a trusteeship.
8. It has been argued [censored] that the new policy of 
the Soviet union vis-a-vis Indonesia leaves us with only one 
practicable alternative, namely, "to continue a moderate program 
of economic and military assistance sufficient to bolster the
p. 7 political position of our friends within Indonesia and to enable 
those who are willing to stand on principle to do so without 
being submerged by the overwhelming temptation of and pressures 
engendered by Soviet offers.” The foregoing alternative would 
seem to epitomize policies that have been tried by the United 
States Government since Indonesia gained her independence and 
that have failed in the attainment of their set objectives to 
keep Indonesia out of Communist hands. We are disposed to argue 
that our national policy should be to treat Indonesia as a case 
in which appeasement, whether by word of [sic] by deed, will buy 
us nothing. Hence to propose stepped up aid as a blueprint for 
future action simply begs the question whether Communist ascen­
dancy in Indonesia can be curbed as long as Sukarno remains in 
power. We believe it cannot. 9
9. It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alter­
native course of action by the United States which would stand 
a good chance of turning the course of events in Indonesia in a 
constructive direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in 
which the influence that the United States can exert, at least 
in the short run, is extremely limited, if (as must be assumed) 
crude and violent intervention is excluded. Any ’’carrot” in the 
form of economic or military aid or diplomatic support that is 
freely given will (for reasons set forth above) be used simply
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to consolidate an essentially unacceptable regime. Any "stick"
p. 8 the United States would be willing to use would be too feeble 
to destroy the regime and would simply accelerate the process 
of disorganization which (it is argued above) is the probable 
prelude to a constitutional Communist take-over. Under these 
difficult circumstances we believe that the least unsatisfactory 
policy for the United States is to apply pressures, but politely 
and without public recrimination, to offer favors, but only on 
tough conditions, and in these ways to create such inducements 
as we can for the Indonesian elite, both civilian and military, 
and for Sukarno himself, to behave in a more constructive 
fashion.
10. At the very minimum we should not now entertain any 
major increases in the scale of economic or military aid to 
Indonesia and we should loose [sic] no opportunity to make clear 
that the reason for our negative action is that the Indonesians 
are in no position to make effective use of such resources in 
pursuit of goals we can support. Perhaps this pressure can 
best be applied affirmatively by giving the impression that we 
would consider substantial economic aid if difficult but essen­
tially technical conditions were met and that we would consider 
increased military aid if we had confidence that Indonesia would 
not resort to aggression against the Dutch and that their mili­
tary services had not already become dangerously dependent on 
Communist Bloc support. Our attitude on these major matters,
p. 9 and on specific political issues as they arise, should be made 
known, using all available contacts, to the military establish­
ment and the leading politicians as well as to Sukarno himself. 
Such a hardening in our posture, without overtones of hostility 
or anger, would serve to alert the conservative elements among 
Indonesia's leadership to the ineluctable necessity of choosing 
between absorption by the Communist Bloc and associations as an 
equal within the comity of free Western and Asian nations. To 
take the opposite position--to appease Sukarno on the West Irian 
and other questions, and to compete with the Bloc in economic 
and military aid in the vain hope of gaining time--would, we 
believe, finally destroy the resolve of conservative elements 
to oppose Sukarno's policies and to act as a brake on the left­
ward and downward course of Indonesia.
11. The coming talks between the President and his Indone­
sian guest offer an important opportunity to convince Sukarno
of the firmness of the United States position on an occasion 
when the treatment accorded him should be flattering and should 
itself convince him of the importance this government attaches 
to the future of his country. It is important that "red carpet" 
treatment and the circumstance of a Presidential meeting should 
not give him the impression that the United States is prepared 
to support him in the basically hostile and unconstructive 
course he currently pursued.
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p. 1 ATTACHMENT A
SUBJECT: President Sukarno - Key to the Indonesian Situation
1. It is evident that Sukarno today and for the immediate 
future decides the fate of Indonesia. This clearly focuses upon 
him responsibility for the drastic turn of events in Indonesia 
which has resulted in its abandonment of true neutrality in ex­
change for a posture of cold-war alignment with a power-bloc 
committed to the destruction of the United States. Our poli­
cies, unless they are attuned to a correct assessment of Presi­
dent Sukarno's personality and philosophy of government, will
be found wanting. There is nothing exceptionally enigmatic 
about Sukarno, his role as one of the founders of Indonesia 
being a matter of well documented historical record. Until re­
cently he was among the most accessible of Asia's national 
leaders. Many prominent Westerners have met him, some enjoyed 
his personal friendship and few have been entirely unsusceptible 
to his personal charm. President Sukarno also makes no effort 
to dissimulate his true ideological predilections. Like Hitler,
p. 2 he is an open book, there to be read. Those who refuse to draw 
the proper conclusions may not be victims of Sukarno's charm, 
but victims of self-delusion.
2. President Sukarno has been described as a man vainly 
seeking accommodation with the West and, finally seeing Indone­
sia's legitimate national aspirations consistently rebuffed, 
reluctantly seeking closer accommodation with the Communist 
bloc. We question whether it is entirely justified to attribute 
the unsatisfactory state of our relations with the regime of 
Indonesia to rebuffs administered to Sukarno by the Eisenhower 
Administration. Sukarno, after his last visit to the United 
States, returned to Indonesia reportedly convinced more firmly 
than ever that the United States wishes him ill and is anxiously 
awaiting his political demise. We are told that if only Presi­
dent Eisenhower had included Djakarta in his Far Eastern itin­
erary, all might have come out well; that had Sukarno, during 
his last sojourn in the United States, been treated with more 
consideration by the American press and singled out by President 
Eisenhower for special attention, relations between the two 
countries would not have dropped to their present low. It may 
be appropriate to mention in this context that no other Asian 
leader has been accorded a state reception quite as lavish and 
cordial as President Sukarno received when he came to our shores 
on his first visit. The late Secretary of State, Mr. John
p. 3 Foster Dulles, on his visit to Indonesia is said to have carried 
away a not unfavorable impression of Sukarno. This notwithstand­
ing, President Sukarno, after his visits to the USSR and Red 
China in 1956 as a curtain raiser to the introduction of "Guided 
Democracy," embarked on a campaign of vilification of the United 
States and its system of government. The only serious grievance 
which Sukarno has to justify the animosities he now appears to 
be harboring against the United States would be the support re­
ceived by the rebellion on the outlying islands; Sukarno and his 
advisors surmise that it enjoyed the official backing of the 
United States Government.
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3. Sukarno needs foreign policy successes, his domestic 
performance having been an unbroken chain of failures. Without 
the support of the Communist bloc, he would be unable to score 
any major foreign policy successes. The Afro-Asian bloc is u n ­
likely to choose him as its leader, although it will probably 
support him on "colonialist11 issues. His close alignment with 
the USSR, and the acquisition of West Irian with Soviet support, 
would redound to the growth of his stature in the eyes of the 
leaders of that bloc.
4. There is reason to believe that the Soviets have taken 
Sukarno’s measure and handle him accordingly, by assiduously 
pandering to his aspirations to become an international big-
p. 4 shot. He may by now have become as susceptible to Soviet influence 
as he was to Japanese influence in the years 1942-1945. The 
Soviets know that, unlike other neutralist leaders of the cali­
ber of Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah, Sukarno is highly manipulata- 
ble. To view the relationship between Sukarno and the Kremlin 
in its entirety as a product of love unrequited by the United 
States, flies in the face of facts. Evidence can be adduced to 
show that Sukarno’s own political proclivities are such that he 
would normally tend toward leftist alignments. He acknowledges 
himself to be a socialist, and that he has a predilection toward 
totalitarianism, can hardly be denied.
5. A great deal has been written about President Sukarno’s 
relations with the Communist Party of Indonesia. By fastening 
on the question whether he himself is or is not a Communist,
the issue can only be obfuscated. Even Sukarno’s most effective 
apologist, Foreign Minister Subandrio, does not deny that Sukarno 
is firmly resolved to avail himself of Communist support in the 
implementation of his concepts and programs, and admits that 
such support has been generously forthcoming. That this arrange­
ment has served to foster the enormous growth of organized com­
munism in Indonesia is generally admitted. No serious student 
of the use of the ’’organizational weapon” by communism could
p. 5 conceive of its being effectively contained within the mechanism 
of a National Front organization.
6. Whether or not Sukarno has reached a formal understand­
ing with Khrushchev to restrain the army’s attempts to contain 
Communist influence in Indonesia remains a moot point. Depend­
able Indonesian observers feel that Sukarno is compelled by 
historical forces to move in a certain direction: he is anti-
Western and wants to continue the Indonesian Revolution. Sukarno 
has no choice but to protect the Communist Party of Indonesia, 
because he needs support from a revolutionary group, and no 
other group but the Communists can give it to him. The army, 
though it had its origin in revolution, is not revolutionary 
enough for his purposes. Consequently, the relationship between 
Sukarno and the Communist Party is a natural one. As long as it 
supports him, he will be glad to leave it alone. Concomitantly, 
he can utilize it, and does, to forestall any attempts on the 
part of the army to increase its political leverage. This ar­
rangement makes it quite easy for Sukarno to remain friends
with the USSR and, for that matter, Red China.
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7. Unless the Communist Party commits a major tactical 
blunder, unfurling its true colors prematurely, the already
p. 6 close relationship between Sukarno and the Communist Party is
bound to be further intensified. Inasmuch as Sukarno is either 
blind to or acquiescent with Communist strategy in Indonesia, 
the eventual upshot of this alliance can be safely predicted.
Here is indeed a man foolishly seeking to ride the back of a 
tiger and bound to end up inside.
8. The belief that, as a last resort, Sukarno and the 
Indonesian Army in league would crush any move to establish 
Communist ascendancy is based upon a number of erroneous prem­
ises. The Communist movement in Indonesia no longer seeks a 
direct confrontation with the forces opposing it but has em­
barked upon a successful policy of legal accession. The Indone­
sian Army, on the other hand, by the admission of its Chief of 
Staff, General Nasution, has likewise abandoned all thought of 
crushing the Communist movement by force. This renunciation has 
been variously interpreted as an act of farsighted statesmanship 
on Nasution’s part (implying the existence of a long range mas­
ter plan for dealing with the Communist threat), as a recogni­
tion of the army's inability to confront the PKI without con­
fronting Sukarno, or as a by-product of the West Irian crisis.
The possibility that the army may no longer be in full control 
of its own destiny because of serious Communist penetrations 
into the ranks of its officers' and non-commissioned officers'
p. 7 corps, though plausible has been relegated since we lack suffi­
ciently hard intelligence to substantiate it.
9. Our policies, in order to be realistic, should be predi­
cated upon the assumption of an untrammeled continuation of Com­
munist growth as long as President Sukarno is at the helm. Such 
growth, however, cannot continue indefinitely without leading
to a Communist takeover--most likely by constitutional, less 
likely by revolutionary means. Ambassador Jones, in November 
I960,* commented on the tenor of Sukarno's speeches as reflecting 
an "increasingly leftist, anti-West line which [is] believed 
[to] stem from [the] extraordinary effect [the West Irian] issue 
[is] exerting on [the] President's thoughts." He found Presi­
dent Sukarno "preoccupied with defining Indonesian socialism" 
and as appearing to "have in mind some form of national commu­
nism." He felt that Sukarno's "recent trip to the United Na­
tions General Assembly appears to have strengthened [his] belief 
[that] 'socialism' is the wave of [the] future." In pursuing 
the course he has mapped for his country's foreign policy (what­
ever may be its cause), President Sukarno will be found neither 
appeasable nor susceptible to more tangible inducements. Only
p. 8 his removal from power.would offer some hope that trends that 
now seem inexorable can still be reversed. Hence, any policy 
move on our part, designed to shore up Sukarno's power and pres­
tige, would be shortsighted, especially if we are interested in 
a radical elimination of the economic abuses upon which the 
Communist movement in Indonesia can be presumed to thrive.
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p. 1 ATTACHMENT B
SUBJECT: Countervailing Forces?
1. The Indonesian Chief of Staff, General Nasution, is 
frequently mentioned as a military strongman who will step into 
the breach once Sukarno’s policies have led Indonesia to the 
brink of disaster. Nasution himself has spared no effort to 
dispel the notion that he wishes to become Indonesiafs man of 
destiny and challenge President Sukarno in that role. Yet, in 
the face of a consistent record of yielding to Sukarno on sev­
eral major counts, those foreign observers who pin their hopes 
on him persist in their conviction that Nasution is following a 
set strategy, allowing for major tactical deviations. We cannot 
share this estimate. The Sukarno/Nasution axis appears quite 
durable. We further believe that a bloodless Sukarno victory 
over the Dutch in West Irian would make a profound impression 
upon the Indonesian High Command, confronting its more conserva­
tive and basically anti-Sukarno elements with the same dilemma 
which led to the collapse of the resistance movement within the 
German General Staff after Hitler acquired the Sudetenland with-
p. 2 out firing a shot. In sum, we cannot visualize General Nasution 
as generating any vital impulses toward a saner foreign policy, 
at least not as long as the West Irian issue is in suspense.
We are further prepared to take Nasution1s word for it that he 
does not seek a confrontation with the Communist Party of Indo­
nesia. We are awaiting more conclusive data before associating 
ourselves fully with Professor Guy Pauker’s thesis that the 
Moscow talks may have forced General Nasution into a de facto 
alliance with the Communist Party. After all, Nasution has per­
mitted, and at times indeed encouraged, anti-Communist actions 
launched by his subordinate commands. Thus far he has not gone 
down the line with the Communists, and, within President Sukar­
n o ’s official family, he represents one of the few remaining 
voices of reason. We are hence at this stage disinclined to 
write him off entirely as an "asset" in the effort to contain 
the Communist Movement in Indonesia.
2. The dissident movement, as an effective countervailing 
force to Sukarno’s policies, will probably have to be counted 
out. Recent developments lend substance to the claims of the 
Indonesian Army that it has the dissidents on the run.
A. Sumatra
(1) The dissident forces in Sumatra total about 7,000 
armed men and are located in Atjeh, Tapanuli and Cen­
tral Sumatra. The strongest of these elements, the
p. 3 5,000-man "Banteng Division" in Central Sumatra, al­
though it exerts widespread control over rural areas 
and represents the best organized and most unified of 
the dissident commands, has recently had defections of 
two key officers and "several hundred" troops.
(2) Troops in Tapanuli, now numbering 1,000- 2,000 
armed men, have been harrassed [sic] and scattered by
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the Indonesian Army until they now lack the numbers, 
equipment and coordination necessary to undertake any 
counteraction against forces opposing them. The origi­
nal Tapanuli fighting force has dwindled by almost 25 
percent over the past three years, owing to surrenders 
and casualties. One military group in south Tapanuli 
is threatening to "secede" from the dissident movement 
and form a separate theocratic state. This move might 
encourage the strongly Muslim Atjehnese to follow suit 
and terminate their uneasy alliance with the dissident 
movement.
(3) Until recently the dissident forces in Atjeh, pres­
ently numbering about 1,000 armed men, have appeared 
p. 4 well-organized and well-supplied. However, Indonesian
Army attacks and a general inability to acquire resup­
plies of arms and ammunition have served to push Atjeh­
nese forces inland. They still control most of the 
Atjehnese countryside, however.
B. Celebes
(4) Most recent reports indicate that 1,000 or more of 
the 2,500- 3,500 dissidents force in North Celebes sur­
rendered with their arms to the Indonesian Army in 
Menado in late February. Colonel Sumual, the de facto 
military commander, will apparently remain in dissi- 
dence, but troops remaining loyal to him appear to com­
prise the equivalent of only two battalions. Colonel 
Kawilarang, one of the most prominent dissident mili­
tary leaders since the start of the uprising, is 
reportedly surrendering and will be resettled overseas 
by the Indonesian Government for an indefinite period.
C. Java
(5) The Indonesian Army has long admitted that the 
8,500-man dissident force in West Java constitutes the 
most deeply entrenched and troublesome dissident force 
p. 5 in Indonesia, but there are recent indications that the
Indonesian Army is launching an "all-out" offensive 
against this group.
3. We conclude from the above estimate that the dissident 
position is becoming progressively worse and that the dissident 
forces are likely to break up into marauding bands or surrender 
within the next six months. This conclusion should serve to 
put to rest any expectation that it can be resuscitated by 
methods short of United States intervention on a major scale.
It should dispose of the theory that the loss of Java to commu­
nism may n o t •automatically spell the loss of the whole of Indo­
nesia as long as dissident forces on the outlying islands hold 
fast.
4. Summing up our conclusions, we find ourselves virtually 
bereft of all countervailing elements which, of their own accord 
or in response to external stimuli, could effectively challenge 
or modify the policies of the Sukarno regime.
Appendix
Central Intelligence Agency 
Office of the Director
7 April 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Brig. General Chester V. Clifton 
Military Aide to the President 
The White House
Attached is the memorandum 
you requested yesterday concerning 
Allen Lawrence Pope.
I should, of course, be happy 
to provide orally or in writing any 
further details which may be required.
(Signed)
Allen W. Dulles 
Director
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p. 1 (President has seen.)
ALLEN L. POPE
1. In November 1957 at a high level in our government 
approval was given to a special political action program in In­
donesia calling for the maintenance as a force in being of the 
anti-pommunist, pro-West dissident movement established by anti- 
Sukarno military commanders in Sumatra and the Celebes. This 
program later authorized the provision of arms and other mili­
tary aid to the dissidents including air support. Several 
C.A.T. pilots volunteered for this work, ostensibly took leave 
from their C.A.T. jobs and, as "Soldiers of Fortune" employed 
by the dissidents, undertook combat missions. On 18 May 1958 
one of these pilots, Mr. Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down by 
anti-aircraft fire and captured while making a bombing attack 
upon shipping in Ambon, Celebes.
2. Pope was tried before an Indonesian Military Tribunal 
in December 1959 on various counts of aiding the enemies of In­
donesia and bearing arms against Indonesia. He was convicted 
and sentenced to death on 29 April 1960. A military appellate 
court upheld this decision in December 1960. An appeal is pend­
ing before the Indonesian Supreme Court. A decision may be an­
nounced at any time. Recent information from the Indonesian 
Prosecutor indicates that it may come prior to President Sukar­
no's departure in late April 1961. If, as expected, the Supreme 
Court confirms the death sentence, Indonesian law requires a 
thirty-day delay before the execution of the sentence, during 
which Sukarno must personally concur in the execution of the 
sentence and Pope will be granted the opportunity to appeal for 
presidential clemency.
p. 2 3. Throughout his many interrogations and the trial itself,
Pope has maintained his story that he volunteered to fly for the 
dissidents of his own free will in the belief that in so doing 
he would be helping to fight communism. He has not implicated 
the United States Government in his activities. The Indonesian 
authorities, however, are by now well aware that the Dissident 
Movement was given support and encouragement by the governments 
of the United States, [censored].
4. Although preservation of Pope's cover story has required 
considerable circumspection on the part of U.S. officials in 
dealing with Indonesian authorities on this subject, the U.S. 
Embassy in Djakarta has been able to maintain contact with Pope 
and with the Indonesian officials immediately concerned with 
his case. Following the imposition of the death sentence, both 
Secretary of State Herter and Ambassador Jones took appropriate 
opportunities to express to Indonesian Foreign Minister Suban- 
drio their concern over the severity of the sentence and the 
damage which its execution might have on U.S.-Indonesian rela­
tions. In December 1960 Pope's wife visited Indonesia and was 
granted a personal interview with President Sukarno in order to 
plead for Sukarno's intercession on her husband's behalf.
Sukarno promised to give the Pope Case his "very deepest con-
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sideration." At this meeting, Ambassador Jones presented to 
Sukarno a letter from President Eisenhower expressing a personal 
interest in the Pope case. In January 1961 U.S. Air Force Gen- 
p. 3 eral White expressed to Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff 
Suryadarma the hope that the Indonesian Government might see 
fit to extend leniency to Pope as a gesture of good will toward 
the United States. Mrs. Pope has recently returned from Indone­
sia and has written to President Kennedy requesting his inter­
cession on her husband's behalf. She plans to return to Indone­
sia to be present when the Supreme Court decision is handed 
down.
5. Despite certain debatable aspects of the Indonesian 
legal proceedings, it is undoubtedly true that Pope was guilty 
of the major charges on which he was convicted. It is quite 
apparent, however, that the final disposition of the case will 
be determined on political rather than purely legal grounds.
The expected timing of the Supreme Court's announcement of its 
decision suggests a connection with the forthcoming meeting be­
tween President Kennedy and President Sukarno.
* * *
6. In my opinion Pope's conduct both before and after his 
capture entitles him to our gratitude and any appropriate action 
to mitigate his sentence.

